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CHANDLER v. MILLER: DRUG TESTING
CANDIDATES FOR STATE OFFICE UNDER THE
"SPECIAL NEEDS" EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
The drug problem in America is not limited to teenagers,
entertainers and athletes-it has infected high public office as
well.' After Washington, D.C. was devastated in 1990 by an
FBI videotape of then-Mayor Marion Barry smoking a pipeful
of crack cocaine,2 the Georgia Legislature passed a statute re-
quiring all candidates seeking qualification for nomination or
election to state office to certify that they have tested negative
for the bodily presence of illegal drugs.'
When the statute was later challenged in Chandler v.
Miller,4 the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing of
candidates for state office was addressed by the Supreme
Court for the first time.
1 United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Brief
for the Washington Legal Foundation and Parents' Association to Neutralize Drug
and Alcohol Abuse, Inc. available in 1996 WL 709329, at *22 n.29; Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (No. 96-126), available in 1996 WL 709329, at *22
n.29 (highlighting the indictment of the Mayor of Bradford, Arkansas for posses-
sion of 65 pounds of marijuana; the indictment of the Mayor of Cooperhill, Ten-
nessee for illegal drug possession; the conviction of the Mayor of Charlestown,
West Virginia for possession of cocaine; the resignation of the Mayor of Asbury
Park, New Jersey following drug possession charges; the arrest of a Richmond,
Virginia City Councilman for selling heroin; and the conviction of a Hartford, Con-
necticut City Councilman for selling illegal drugs).
2 James Carney, Forgive Me, Voter, TIME, Sept. 12, 1994, at 43.
3 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-140 (1993), repealed by 1998 GA. LAWS 295, §1 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1999).
4 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
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The Court held that Georgia's drug-free certification re-
quirement was unconstitutional, thereby adding further ambi-
guity to the judicially-created but ill-defined "special needs"
exception to the Fourth Amendment.5 The special needs excep-
tion, which has been used to uphold suspicionless drug testing
in a variety of contexts,6 provides that in limited "special" cir-
cumstances, a state may constitutionally search an individual
despite the absence of grounds for suspecting that person of
illegal activity.' Only if the special needs threshold is met will
the Court continue its Fourth Amendment inquiry by applying
a balancing test, weighing an individual's privacy expectations
against the government's interests to determine whether the
suspicionless search at issue is reasonable.8
Commentators have warned that the amorphous special
needs exception has created a slippery slope inviting "the con-
tinued erosion of the basic principles of the Fourth Amend-
ment."9 In an unconvincing effort to distinguish Chandler from
previous cases upholding suspicionless drug testing,"0 the Su-
'Id.
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651 (1995) (finding
a special need for suspicionless drug testing of student athletes); National Trea-
sury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (finding a special
need for suspicionless drug testing of United States Customs Service employees
whose positions involved the interdiction of illegal drugs or the carrying of a fire-
arm); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989)
(decided on the same day as Von Raab) (finding a special need for suspicionless
drug testing of employees involved in certain train accidents); see also discussion
infra Part I.B.
' See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; Skinner, 489
U.S. at 619.
8 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; Skinner, 489
U.S. at 619.
' Jennifer L. Malin, Comment, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Fur-
ther Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 469, 517 (1996); see
also Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Excep-
tion Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
529, 563 (1997) (arguing that loosely defining special needs results in a "malleable
and unprincipled" Fourth Amendment analysis); George M. Dery III, Are Politi-
cians More Deserving of Privacy than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller
Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 73, 103 (1998) (arguing that the special needs exception has resulted in a
"steady dilution of privacy rights"); Andrea Lewis, Comment, Drug Testing: Can
Privacy Interests Be Protected Under the "Special Needs" Doctrine?, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 1013, 1035 (1990) (arguing that the special needs doctrine has an "unlimited
opportunity for broad application").
"o See cases cited supra note 6.
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preme Court heeded these concerns by raising the special
needs threshold while purporting to apply its familiar analy-
sis." The Court's application of heightened scrutiny and the
resulting invalidation of Georgia's candidate drug-free certifica-
tion requirement was achieved, in fact, only through the direct
contradiction of special needs precedent. 2  Moreover,
regardless of whether the special needs threshold needed to be
raised in order to preserve Fourth Amendment ideals, Chan-
dler was certainly not the appropriate case in which to raise it
as states have long been afforded great deference when exer-
cising their sovereign powers to establish qualifications for
their own state officers."
Part I of this Comment explains basic Fourth Amendment
principles and the evolution of the special needs doctrine. Part
II discusses the factual and procedural history of Chandler v.
Miller.'4 Part III explains why the Chandler statute should
have been upheld. It considers the departure from precedent
and faulty reasoning that ultimately led the Supreme Court to
conclude that Georgia's need to obtain drug-free certification
from candidates for state office ranked as merely "hypotheti-
cal" and "symbolic" rather than "special."" Finally, the re-
mainder of Part III considers a state's Tenth Amendment pow-
ers to establish qualifications for its own officers. It argues
that validation of Georgia's drug testing statute would not
have diminished traditional Fourth Amendment principles
because a finding of special needs could have been limited to
the unique context of election qualification statutes where
states have long been "exclusive and free from external inter-
ference, except so far as plainly provided by the
Constitution. .... .
, See discussion infra Parts II.B.3.b, III.
12 Although this Comment argues that the Chandler statute should have been
upheld, even those who are pleased with the outcome of the case recognize that
the Court "preserved individual privacy by incorrectly distorting special needs
reasoning." Dery, supra note 9, at 74; see also discussion infra Part III.
13 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991); see also discussion
infra Part III.B.2.
14 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
'5 Id. at 318-22.
" Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900).
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I. THE FOURTH AmENDMENT
A. Background
The text of the Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses:
the Reasonableness Clause, which prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the Warrant Clause, which requires
that warrants only be issued upon probable cause and that
they be detailed and limited in their scope.' Whether the two
clauses stand independent of one another, or whether the War-
rant Clause modifies the Reasonableness Clause thereby defin-
ing what is reasonable, has been the subject of extensive de-
bate among legal scholars. 8 The traditional view is that all
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless autho-
rized by a warrant issued upon a demonstration of probable
cause. 9 However, the Court's more recent opinions suggest
'7 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or afffimation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
For a history of searches and seizures in England and the Colonies prior to
the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, see Thomas _ Clancy, The Role of Indi-
vidualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 483, 487-517 (1995).
18 Compare, JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 42 (1966) (noting that the Warrant Clause gives meaning to the Reason-
ableness Clause); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396-98, 410-14 (1974) (arguing that history supports the
view that searches are unreasonable unless authorized by warrant); Tracey Maclin,
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (1994) (arguing that the Warrant Clause defines and interprets the
Reasonableness Clause); and Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Princi-
ples, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855-56 (1994) (arguing that warrants and probable
cause are the "touchstone" of constitutionally reasonable searches) with TELFORD
TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTTUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43 (1969) (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment was not designed to make most searches covered by war-
rants), and Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 761-85 (1994) (arguing that the "core" of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, not the issuance of a warrant or probable cause). For a summary
of the two competing views, see Clancy, supra note 17, at 517-26; James J.
Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103 (1992); and Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth
Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIm. L. REV. 1389 (1989).
19 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
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that the Warrant Clause requirements are not the sine qua
non of reasonableness." Rather, the Court has emphasized
that what is reasonable "'depends on all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search
or seizure itself."2'
Regardless of how the Supreme Court has interpreted the
relationship between the two clauses of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court has traditionally required at least some level
of individualized suspicion when considering the reasonable-
ness of a search or seizure.2 When governmental intrusion
amounts to a "full" search or seizure, as in the case of an ar-
rest, the level of individualized suspicion required to justify the
intrusion is known as "probable cause," defined as "a fair prob-
ability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place."' When the governmental intrusion is less
extensive, as in the case of a mere frisk of a suspect's outer
clothing, the Court requires a lesser showing than probable
cause known as "reasonable suspicion."24 However, "neither a
warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of indi-
vidualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reason-
ableness in every circumstance."'
The Supreme Court first departed from its traditional
individualized suspicion requirement in 1967 when it validated
warrants issued for area-wide building, health and fire code
inspections in Camara v. Municipal Court.2" The Court did
not require specific evidence of a code violation in any particu-
lar dwelling, but nonetheless concluded that the warrants
issued were reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment by employing an abstract balancing
test-"balancing the need to search against the invasion which
20 See cases cited supra note 6.
21 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quot-
ing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
" See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
24 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (defining reasonable suspicion as "spe-
cific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
' National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
2r 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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the search entails."27 Unlike a search pursuant to a criminal
investigation to recover stolen contraband or goods, the inspec-
tion programs at issue in Camara were "aimed at securing
city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for
private property."8 The primary governmental interest at
stake was the prevention of conditions hazardous to public
health and safety. The Court found that the only effective
way to seek universal compliance with these minimum stan-
dards was through routine periodic inspections of all struc-
tures. 0 Thus, Camara was the "fountainhead" of many factors
relied on by the Court in subsequent cases to justify its depar-
ture from the requirements of individualized suspicion and use
of the reasonableness balancing test.31 Those factors include
the non-criminal nature of the search, the impracticability of a
search based on individualized suspicion, the preventative
government goals and the relatively non-intrusive nature of
the invasion.
B. The Special Needs Exception and Suspicionless Drug
Testing
One category of Fourth Amendment cases that eliminates
the requirement of individualized suspicion and triggers the
reasonableness balancing test includes those where the Court
finds "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, mak[ing] the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable."33 Suspicionless drug testing has often fallen
27 Id. at 536-37.
28 Id. at 535.
" See id.
'0 See id. at 535-36.
" Clancy, supra note 17, at 548. The Supreme Court has used the balancing
test in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 J. v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646 (1995) (drug testing of student athletes); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of railroad employees); Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of Customs Service employees); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868 (1987) (supervision of probationers and parolees); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (student searches); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979) (vehicle checkpoints); and United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)
(border searches).
22 See Clancy, supra note 17, at 548.
23 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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within this special needs category. 4 Specifically, in a trilogy
of cases decided prior to Chandler, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a special need for the suspicionless drug testing of rail-
road employees, 5 Customs Service employees 6 and student
athletes."
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,8 the
Supreme Court found that the government's interest in regu-
lating railroad safety created a special need for federal regula-
tions mandating the suspicionless drug testing of railroad
employees.3 " Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy based
his determination on the fact that railroad employees were
engaged in "safety-sensitive tasks,"4° and that on-the-job in-
toxication was a significant problem in the railroad indus-
try." Having concluded that a special need existed, Justice
Kennedy explained the reasonableness balancing test that it
triggered: "In limited circumstances, where the privacy inter-
ests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an im-
portant governmental interest furthered by- the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of
such suspicion." 2 The Skinner Court found that the govern-
ment had a compelling interest in drug testing railroad em-
ployees because of the safety-sensitive nature of their posi-
tions, the deterrent effect that testing would provide, and the
invaluable information about the causes of accidents that it
would help obtain.43 In contrast, the Court found that the in-
trusion on the privacy interests of the railroad employees was
minimal because those employed in a highly regulated indus-
s, See infra notes 35-60 and accompanying text.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602.
36 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
'7 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646.
3, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
" See id. at 620.
4" Id.
41 See id. at 607. The Federal Railroad Administration "identified 34 fatalities,
66 injuries and over $28 million in property damage (in 1983 dollars) that result-
ed from the errors of alcohol and drug-impaired employees in 45 train accidents
and train incidents during the period 1975 through 1983." Id. at 608.
42 Id. at 624.
' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
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try, where "even a momentary lapse of attention can have
disastrous consequences," have a diminished expectation of
privacy.44
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,45 decided on the same day as Skinner, the Court upheld
a suspicionless drug testing plan implemented by the United
States Customs Service to test those employees seeking trans-
fer or promotion to positions involving drug interdiction or the
carrying of a firearm.46 Writing for the majority again, Justice
Kennedy found that the need for deterring drug use among
those eligible for promotion to such sensitive positions within
the Service, and preventing the promotion of drug users to
those positions, amounted to a special need "no less than" the
need for safe rail transportation at issue in Skinner.47 Apply-
ing the reasonableness balancing test, the Court determined
that the government's interest in conducting suspicionless
searches outweighed the privacy interests of the Service em-
ployees.48 Because the Customs Service is "our Nation's first
line of defense against one of the greatest problems affecting
the health and welfare of our population," Justice Kennedy
opined that the government had a "compelling interest" in
ensuring that the employees were physically fit and had "un-
impeachable integrity and judgment."49 Otherwise, Justice
Kennedy reasoned, the employees might be tempted to take
bribes from the drug traffickers with whom they deal, or to
abuse the vast sources of valuable contraband to which they
have access.5° Regarding those employees who were required
to carry firearms, Justice Kennedy added that "the public
4 See id. at 624-27.
4' 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
41 See id. A third category of employees that were subjected to suspicionless
drug testing under the government's plan were those required to "handle classified
material." Id. at 677. The Court opined that the government did have a special
need for requiring those employees likely to gain access to sensitive information to
submit to drug testing. See id. However, because it was unclear whether this
category of employees as defined by the Service's directive encompassed only those
individuals who would be likely to gain such access, the Court was unable to
address the issue of reasonableness and remanded the case to the court of appeals
for clarification of the scope of this category. See id. at 677-78.
47 Id. at 666.
See id. at 668.
49 Id. at 668-70.
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 669.
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should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from
impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to posi-
tions where they may need to employ deadly force."51 Finally,
turning to the intrusion on the employees' privacy interests,
the majority held, as in Skinner, that the infringement was
minimal due to a diminished expectation of privacy that re-
sults from their position: "Because successful performance of
their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity,
these employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the
Service personal information that bears directly on their fit-
ness."
52
The last case before Chandler to consider special needs for
suspicionless drug testing was Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton. 3 In Vernonia, Justice Scalia authored the majority
opinion finding that a special need existed for the school
district's Student Athlete Drug Policy' because strict adher-
ence to warrant and probable cause requirements would under-
cut "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools."5 Invoking the rea-
sonableness balancing test, the Court concluded that the
government's interest in testing outweighed the privacy inter-
ests of the athletes to be tested." The majority reasoned that
the government's interest in deterring drug abuse by the
nation's schoolchildren was at least as important as the
government's interest in deterring drug abuse by railroad em-
ployees in Skinner and protecting drug interdiction efforts in
Von Raab.57 The Court also emphasized the fact that the Ver-
nonia testing scheme was narrowly tailored to athletes, who
were "the leaders of the drug culture,"58 but that it would ad-
", Id. at 671.
12 Id. at 672.
53 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
"' Under the Policy, students desiring to play a sport were required to sign a
form consenting to drug testing and obtain the written consent of their parents.
Id. at 650. The athletes are tested at the beginning of the season for their sport.
Id. Additionally, once each week 10% of the athletes are randomly selected for
testing. See id.
"5 Id. at 653 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41) (1985). The
Policy was implemented after a sharp increase in student disciplinary problems
that correlated with a dramatic increase in student drug abuse. Id. at 648-49.
- See id. at 664-65.
-7 See id. at 661.
" Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
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dress the "'role model' effect" on other students. 9 As for the
privacy interests of the student athletes, the Court concluded
that "students within the school environment have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of the population general-
ly" and that privacy expectations are even less with regard to
student athletes because they voluntarily subject themselves to
heightened regulation by trying out for a team.60
Based upon the foregoing, it seemed certain that when the
Court granted certiorari in Chandler,6' it was going to find a
state's interest in having a drug-free governor, and other high
ranking state officials, 62 to be no less "special" than the gov-
ernmental interest in having drug-free railroad employees, 6'
Customs Service employees' and high school athletes. 5
However, the Court "refused to carry special needs precedent
to this natural conclusion."6 Instead, the special needs scruti-
ny that the Chandler Court applied was much more exacting
then it had been in previous cases. 7
II. CHANDLER V. MILLER
A. The Facts
In 1990 the Georgia Legislature enacted a statute68 re-
quiring each candidate seeking to qualify for nomination or
election to a state office69 to certify that he or she has tested
negative for the bodily presence of illegal drugs7" within thirty
'9 Id. at 663.
ro Id. at 657.
61 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
62 See infra note 69.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
64 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
' See Dery, supra note 9, at 94.
'7 See discussion infra Parts II.B.3.b, III.
66 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-140 (1993), repealed by 1998 GA. LAWS 295, §1 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1999).
69 The statute defines state office as the office of any of the following: the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School
Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commis-
sioner of Labor, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals,
judges of the superior courts, district attorneys, members of the General Assembly,
and members of the Public Service Commission. See id.
7 The prohibited drugs are marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines or
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days prior to qualification. A candidate was required to provide
a test specimen, either at a laboratory approved by the State
Commissioner of Human Resources or at the office of the
candidate's personal physician." When testing was complete,
the statute directed the laboratory to prepare a certificate re-
porting the results only to the candidate. 2 No candidate was
permitted to qualify for nomination or election to a State office
unless he or she had filed such certificate, indicating negative
test results, with the State at the time of qualification. 3
A challenge to this practice arose in 1994 when the Liber-
tarian Party nominated Walker L. Chandler for the office of
Lieutenant Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of Com-
missioner of Agriculture, and James D. Walker for the office of
member of the General Assembly. 4 One month before the
deadline for submission of the certificates required by the stat-
ute, Chandler, Harris and Walker filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia re-
questing declaratory and injunctive relief barring enforcement
of the statute. 5 The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the
statute violated their right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 6
B. The Courts' Decisions
1. The District Court
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
explained that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
phencyclidine, "except when used pursuant to a valid prescription or when other-
wise authorized by state or federal law." Id-
"1 The actual tests are conducted at a State approved laboratory in a manner
consistent with the United States Department of Health and Human Services
Guidelines or other professionally valid procedures approved by the Commissioner.
See id.
72 See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-140 (1993), repealed by 1998 GA. LAWS 295, §1
(effective Jan. 1, 1999).
3 See id.
See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 310 (1997).
7 See Chandler v. Miller, 952 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1994), affd, 73 F.3d
1543 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
71 See id. at 805.
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remedy that is only granted where the moving party clearly
establishes a substantial likelihood that he or she will ulti-
mately prevail on the merits of the claim." Here, the
plaintiffs' claim was that it was unreasonable for Georgia to
require candidates for state office to certify that they have
tested negative for the presence of illegal drugs without a
showing of individualized suspicion. 8 However, the district
court explained that such suspicionless searches may be rea-
sonable, where there are "special needs, beyond the ordinary
needs of law enforcement." 9 Where such special needs exist,
the court applies a balancing test, weighing "the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to
determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or
some level of individualized suspicion in the particular con-
text."80
The district court found that the State offices of Lieuten-
ant Governor, Commissioner of Agriculture and member of the
General Assembly were more than just ordinary government
jobs,"1 and that Georgia's interest in their operation gave rise
to special governmental needs that triggered application of the
reasonableness balancing test. 2 Under the balancing test, the
district court concluded that the drug-free certification require-
ment was reasonable and that Georgia had demonstrated val-
id, compelling concerns.' In particular, the court noted that
" See id. The movant must also show: (1) that he or she will suffer irrepara-
ble injury unless the injunction issues; (2) proof that the threatened injury to him
or her outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the oppos-
ing party; and (3) that issuing the injunction would not be adverse to the public
interest. See id. (citing Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 819 (11th Cir.
1987)).
78 See Chandler, 952 F. Supp. at 805.
,9 Id. at 806 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665 (1989) (holding that United States Customs Service's suspicionless drug
testing of employees whose positions involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or the
carrying of a firearm was reasonable); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989) (holding that the Federal Railroad Administration
regulation requiring blood testing for employees involved in certain train accidents
was reasonable); see also supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
80 Id. at 806.
81 See id. The court cited the Georgia State Constitution, art. I, § II, cl. I,
which provides that "Public officers are the trustees and servants of the people
and are at all times amenable to them."
82 See Chandler, 952 F. Supp. at 806.
See id.
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Georgia was justifiably concerned that those seeking office be
drug-free, "both because of the power many elected officials
have to influence the effort to interdict the drug trade... and
because of the negative societal effects ... which would flow
from the revelation that an elected official is a drug abuser." '
The court further noted that under the statute, the candidate
is able to control the date, time, and location where the speci-
men is produced and that the test results are sent directly to
the candidate through the mail.' Thus, if the results are posi-
tive, the candidate can withdraw from the race without others
knowing that he or she did not qualify because of positive drug
test results.' Finally, the district court concluded that intru-
sion on the plaintiffs' privacy was de minimis and was out-
weighed by the State's compelling interest in having drug-free
state officers. 7 Accordingly, the court held that the statute
was unlikely to be found violative of the Fourth Amendment,
and the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was de-
nied.8"
2. The Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that
Georgia's drug-free certification requirement did not violate the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.9 Like
the district court, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the reasonable-
ness balancing test based on a similar finding of special
needs.' However, before assessing Georgia's interests under
the balancing test, the court highlighted the considerable def-
erence Georgia was entitled to because of the historical impor-
tance that the states be "exclusive and free" to prescribe the
4 Id.
"' See id.
86 See id. at 807.
" See Chandler, 952 F. Supp. at 807-08.
" See id.
,' See Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S.
305 (1997).
"0 See id. at 1545.
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qualifications of their own officers.9 Setting such qualifica-
tions, the court recognized, is "obviously essential to the inde-
pendence of the states, and to their peace and tranquility."92
Interpreting special needs precedent, 3 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit concluded that a state's interest under the balancing test
is calculated with reference to two factors: "the level of docu-
mented evidence of a past problem and the fundamental incon-
sistency of drug use with the demands of the position."94 Since
Georgia had not argued that its elected officials had abused
drugs in the past, the court focused on whether drug abuse is
"fundamentally incompatible with high state office."" Noting
that the people of Georgia place their liberty, safety, economic
well-being and the ultimate responsibility for law enforcement
in the trust of their elected officials, the court reasoned that
"[tlhe nature of high public office in itself demands the highest
levels of honesty, clear-sightedness, and clear-thinking."96 For
example, Georgia law requires that the Governor must respond
to state emergencies, direct state law enforcement agencies,
appoint important officers and boards, and if necessary call out
the state militia.9" Similarly, the Lieutenant Governor is
President of the Senate and is to replace the Governor should
the office become vacant.98 Furthermore, the court noted that
illegal drug users holding these high offices might be unsympa-
thetic to Georgia's drug interdiction efforts and highly suscepti-
ble to risks of bribery and blackmail. 9 Thus, the court stated,
"Simply put, the state's interest in filling these positions with
drug-free people is great."00
91 Id. (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900)).
92 Id. (quoting Taylor, 178 U.S. at 570-71).
's See cases cited supra note 6.
" Chandler, 73 F.3d at 1545; see also supra notes 41 and 55. In National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669-70 (1989), there was no
evidence of a prior substance abuse problem, but the Court found a compelling
interest in ensuring that "front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and
have unimpeachable integrity and judgment." Id.





'o Chandler, 73 F.3d at 1546.
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Balancing these strong state interests against the
plaintiffs' individual privacy expectations, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that the statute was relatively
noninvasive.'0 ' The court re-emphasized that principles of
federalism derived from the Tenth Amendment weighed heavi-
ly in favor of the states on matters central to their gover-
nance.0 2 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary in-
junction and held that Georgia's drug-free certification statute
was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
0 3
3. The Supreme Court's Opinions
a. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's decision, holding that Georgia's requirement
that candidates for state office pass a drug test did not fit into
the "closely guarded category" of constitutionally permissible
suspicionless searches based on special needs.
04 Writing for
the majority, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that only "[in lim-
ited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by
the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy
by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion."'
5 The ma-
jority opined that Georgia had not established a special need
because there was neither evidence of prior drug abuse by
Georgia's officeholders nor evidence that drug addicts were
"' See Chandler 73 F.3d at 1547; see also supra notes 85-87 and accompanying
text.
" See Chandler, 73 F.3d at 1549.
10 Id.
'" Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997). "While Judge Edmonson of the
Eleventh Circuit faithfully delivered the standard lines regarding special needs
balancing, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Supreme Court in Chandler, threw
away the script." Dery, supra note 9, at 87; see also discussion infra Part III.
1" Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n., 489 U.S. 603, 624 (1989)). The majority then summarized the facts of the
cases which it considered to be most directly on point: Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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likely to become candidates for public office, and that the stat-
ute was ineffective as a deterrent because potential candidates
were made aware of the test date and could simply abstain
from drug use during the pre-test period."° Hence, the Court
concluded that the State's need was not "special," but merely
"hypothetical" and "symbolic" of its commitment to the societal
war on drugs."7
The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the
special needs analysis should be viewed through a different
lens because the statute implicated Georgia's sovereign power,
reserved to it under the Tenth Amendment, to establish quali-
fications for its own state officers.' s The respondents had
based this argument on Gregory v. Ashcroft,'°9 where the Su-
preme Court upheld Missouri's mandatory retirement provision
for judges over the age of seventy against the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and federal statutory
claims."1 The Chandler Court conceded that Gregory stands
for the principle that states "enjoy wide latitude" to establish
conditions of candidacy for state office, but the Court warned
that "in setting such conditions, they may not disregard basic
constitutional protections."' Because Gregory was a Four-
teenth Amendment case, and there was no precedent where a
state's power to establish qualifications for its officers had
diminished constraints on state action imposed directly by the
Fourth Amendment, the Court declined to extend Georgia the
"wide latitude" of deference that was afforded in Gregory."'
Before engaging in the special needs analysis, however, the
majority indicated that Georgia's drug testing statute was
"relatively noninvasive," and that if a special need was shown,
the statute could not be faulted for excessive intrusion on the
1"6 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-21.
'0' Id. at 322.
100 See id. at 317-18.
100 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
110 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 316.
m Id.
1 Id. at 317.
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candidates' privacy interests."' Therefore, the "core issue" for
the majority was whether Georgia's certification requirement
was warranted by a special need."
Attempting to clarify what constitutes a special need, the
Court articulated, "the proffered special need for drug testing
must be substantial-important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion."" 5 The Court concluded that Geor-
gia had not made such a showing despite its argument that
drug use is incompatible with holding high state office because
it "draws into question an official's judgment and integrity;
jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including
antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public confi-
dence and trust in elected officials.""'
Specifically, the Court explained that Georgia had failed to
meet its burden of establishing a special need for its drug
testing statute primarily because it offered no evidence of any
real "concrete danger.""7 The majority highlighted an admis-
sion made by counsel for the respondents at oral argument,
namely, that Georgia has had no particular problem with state
officeholders being drug abusers in the past."' The Court al-
so stressed that the statute would be highly ineffective as a
deterrent to drug users seeking office because the candidates
were made aware of the test date and could simply abstain for
the pre-test period thereby avoiding detection."' With respect
to addicts who are not capable of abstention, the Court again
highlighted the lack of evidence that such individuals were
likely to be candidates for public office in Georgia. 20 Finally,
113 Id. at 318. The Court noted, in particular, that the statute permits a candi-
date to provide the test specimen in the office of his or her own physician, and
that the results are sent directly to the candidate, who can control their further
dissemination. See id. The details of the statute are discussed in supra notes 68-
73 and accompanying text.
.1. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
1 Id. at 318.
16 Id. (citing Respondent's Brief, Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (No.
96-126) available in 1996 WL 708930, at *11-18.
117 Id.
118 See id.
9 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-20.
120 See id.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the Court reasoned that should a drug addict succeed in ob-
taining a high state office, the public limelight would be suffi-
cient to uncover such office holder's drug abuse because public
officials are subject to relentless scrutiny.'21  Accordingly, the
Court found the absence of a genuine threat to public safety
and that the statute's singular function was as a "symbolic"
gesture of Georgia's anti-drug position.'22 Thus, the Court
concluded that "[however well-meant, the candidate drug test
Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's
sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state
action."'23
b. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented arguing that Georgia's
drug-free certification requirement for candidates seeking state
office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.124 Jus-
tice Rehnquist feared that the novelty of the Georgia statute
may have unjustifiably led the Court to strike it down." The
Chief Justice sharply criticized the majority for distorting pre-
cedent and rewriting the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. 126 Justice Rehnquist also argued that the majority
used flawed reasoning in concluding that the statute had only
a symbolic purpose and effect, and that the Constitution does
not prevent a state from enacting an election qualification
statute simply because it may seem misguided or even, silly to
some members of the Supreme Court. 7
The Chief Justice was particularly disturbed by the
majority's quest to raise the threshold for what constitutes a
special need by mischaracterizing precedent. 21 Justice
Rehnquist contended that prior to Chandler, the class of per-
missible suspicionless searches had not been described by the
121 See id.
122 Id. at 322.
123 Id.
12 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
- See id. at 323-24.
126 See id. at 323-27.
127 See id. at 328.
1- See id. at 325.
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Court as "closely guarded" or requiring any great impor-
tance.'29 Rather, under Skinner and Von Raab, if there exist-
ed a proper governmental purpose beyond the ordinary needs
of law enforcement, then a special need existed that triggered
the reasonableness balancing test under the Fourth Amend-
ment.
130
Specifically, Justice Rehnquist's dissent focused on the
inconsistencies between the majority's opinion and the Court's
decision in Von Raab.' Citing Von Raab, Justice Rehnquist
insisted that empirical evidence of a prior drug problem was
not an essential element for finding a special need.
32 Fur-
thermore, the Chief Justice attacked the majority's contention
that the absence of such evidence rendered Georgia's need
hypothetical and merely symbolic. Justice Rehnquist reasoned,
"[S]urely the State need not wait for a drug addict, or one
inclined to use drugs illegally, to run for or actually become
Governor before it installs a prophylactic mechanism.
".33
The Chief Justice also noted that two of the justifications
that the Court used to uphold suspicionless drug testing in
Von Raab were also applicable to the instant case.' The Von
Raab Court held that the government had a compelling inter-
est in ensuring that Customs Service employees did not use
drugs, even when off-duty, because such use would create a
risk of bribery and blackmail against which the government
was entitled to guard.'35 Justice Rehnquist argued that the
risks of bribery and blackmail for high-level officials of state
government are at least as significant as those for off-duty
Service officials.'36 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist pointed out
that one of the three categories of Service employees in Von
Raab that were subject to testing included those who sought
promotion to positions that required the handling of classified
' Chandler, 520 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
130 See id.
,3' See id. at 326-27; see also supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
1 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also supra
note 95.
133 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
13 See id. at 326-27.
'5 See id. (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 674 (1989)).
1'3 See id. at 326.
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materials.'37 The Von Raab Court reasoned that employees
who sought to attain such positions involving sensitive infor-
mation could expect that background checks and examinations
would be required, and they therefore had a diminished expec-
tation of privacy with respect to a urinalysis test.3 ' Justice
Rehnquist argued that the same reasoning held true for can-
didates for high state office.3 9
Additionally, the Chief Justice attacked the majority's
criticism of the design and effectiveness of Georgia's stat-
ute.40 Justice Rehnquist believed that Georgia had designed
one of the least intrusive types of urinalysis drug testing con-
ceivable by allowing candidates to schedule production of the
specimen in the office of their own physician any time within
thirty days prior to qualifying for the ballot. Ironically, the ma-
jority held this against the State by arguing that giving candi-
dates advance notice of the test renders it ineffective by allow-
ing candidates an opportunity to abstain from drug use during
the pre-test period.' Justice Rehnquist suggested, however,
that the non-intrusive aspects of the statute only helped to
establish its reasonableness, and he recognized that had the
statute prescribed a random testing method, the majority
would have faulted it for intrusiveness.'
Finally, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the majority
perversely relied on the fact that the relentless scrutiny by the
media of candidates on a public stage would be sufficient to
detect drug abusers." The dissent argued that such scrutiny
by the media exemplifies the diminished expectation of privacy
that political candidates have, and that Skinner and Von Raab
clearly establish that state governments need not rely on peer,
media or any other type of scrutiny when they, themselves, can
design a reasonable, non-invasive drug test.""
... See id. at 327 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677); see also supra note 47.
138 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
-3' See id. at 326.
140 See id. at 328.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 326.
1"3 See Chandler, 520 U.S. 326 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
144 See id.
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III. ANALYSIS
Chandler was decided against a trilogy of suspicionless
drug testing cases"" that provided little guidance for the
identification of a special need. 4" The only explicit criteria
that such opinions offered was that the alleged special need
must be non-criminal in nature-"beyond the normal need for
law enforcement."'47  Yet, by uniformly upholding the
suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees, 4 s Customs
Service employees 49 and high school athletes,
50 the Su-
preme Court's application of the special needs doctrine had, in
fact, become both consistent and predictable.' Chandler
broke the mold.
A. Special Needs versus Symbolic Needs
Although the Chandler Court conceded that Georgia's
candidate drug testing statute would have survived the reason-
ableness balancing test if a special need had been shown, the
Court erroneously concluded that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and that the Fourth Amendment's traditional require-
ment of individualized suspicion could not be waived because
the special needs threshold had not been met.5 Justice
14 See cases cited supra note 6.
" See Dery, supra note 9, at 88-89. Professor Dery argues that:
The special needs balancing analysis is not truly an analysis at all. It
merely demonstrates whether or not as few as five members of the Court
value a particular government action. Chandler exemplifies this judicial
whimsy... Instead of acknowledging the doctrine's lack of standards,
the Court employed the tests offensive subjectivity in order to rule for
the individuals. The spineless special needs test was bent by the Chan-
dler Court in the direction of its latest choosing.
Id. See also Suspicionless Drug Testing, 111 HARV. L. REV. 289, 296 (1997) (citing
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2498 (1996) (arguing that special
needs is a hazy concept)); and Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creat-
ing a Chasm in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 98
(1992) (arguing that the special needs doctrine lacks an objective framework).
" Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
1" Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
." National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
150 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995).
..1 See Dery, supra note 9, at 91.
152 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-22.
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Ginsburg explained that Georgia had not established a special
need because there was neither evidence of prior drug abuse by
Georgia's officeholders nor evidence that drug addicts were
likely to become candidates for public office, and that the stat-
ute was ineffective as a deterrent because potential candidates
were made aware of the test date and could simply abstain
from drug use during the pre-test period.'53 Hence, the Court
concluded that the State's need was not "special,"15 4 but
merely "hypothetical" and "symbolic" of its commitment to the
societal war on drugs.'
Despite the Court's rhetoric, Georgia's need for drug-free
certification from candidates for State office was far from hypo-
thetical or symbolic, and was indeed, special.'56 Few would
doubt that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems
confronting our society today.'57 There is no reason to suspect
that high public office is immune.'58 In recent years several
mayors and city councilmen have been convicted for the pos-
session or sale of illegal drugs including marijuana, heroin and
cocaine.'59 The unfortunate reality of a special governmental
... See id. at 319-20. Although this section primarily demonstrates the incon-
sistency. between Chandler and Von Raab with respect to the Court's emphasis on
evidence of prior drug abuse, it should also be noted that the Chandler Court's
efficacy requirement is likewise contradictory to its holding in Von Raab. 489 U.S.
at 673. In Von Raab, the Court was aware that "no more than 5 employees out of
3600 have tested positive for drugs," but it held that "[tihe mere circumstance
that all but a few of the employees tested are entirely innocent of wrongdoing
does not impugn the program's validity." Id. at 674. The Court further held that
"no employee reasonably can expect to deceive the test by the simple expedient of
abstaining after the test date is assigned." Id. at 676.
... Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322. "But this term ['special'] as used in Skinner and
Von Raab and on which the Court now relies, was used in a quite different sense
than it is used by the Court today." Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). Pro-
fessor Dery explains:
In considering whether Georgia had established a "special need" for drug
testing, Justice Ginsburg, redefined the term "special." "Special" no longer
meant a justification "apart from the regular needs of law enforcement";
it referred to the measure of the importance of the state's justification.
Now, the government's "need" had to be "substantial," indeed, big enough
to "override the normal requirement of individualized suspicion." The
Court then found that the candidate urinalysis program could not meet
this newly calibrated standard.
Dery, supra note 9, at 87-88 (footnotes omitted).
... Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
15 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
15 See id.
158 See id.
159 See supra note 1; see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J. dis-
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need for certification that candidates for high public office are
drug-free was made all too clear by District of Columbia Judge
Thomas Penfield Jackson, who sentenced former D.C. Mayor
Marion Barry following his 1990 conviction for possession of
cocaine:
Of greatest significance to me in sentencing this defendant is the
high public office he has at all relevant times occupied... His
breach of public trust alone warrants an enhanced sentence... By
his own unlawful conduct the defendant rendered himself beholden
to, and thus vulnerable to influence from anyone who had first-hand
knowledge of it... [he] has given aid, comfort, and encouragement
to the drug culture at large, and contributed to the anguish that
illegal drugs have ixflicted on this city in so many ways .... "'
In light of the devastating impact that flows from the
revelation that a powerful elected official is a drug abuser,
16'
a state should not have to wait for a drug abuser to become its
governor, secretary of state or school superintendent before it
can take preventative measures.'
62 To suggest otherwise
would be to argue that the government should be precluded
from taking air piracy precautions absent proof of a prior ca-
tastrophe at the particular airport in question."
6 This was
precisely the reasoning that the Von Raab Court used to per-
mit a finding of special needs for the suspicionless drug testing
of Customs Service employees despite an admission by the
Commissioner of Customs that the Service was "largely drug-
free.""6 In fact, when the petitioners in Von Raab argued
that the Service's drug testing program was unjustified be-
cause it was not implemented in response to a perceived drug
problem among Service employees, the Court explicitly rejected
that argument as "unpersuasive" because it took an "unduly
senting) ("It would take a bolder person than I to say that such widespread drug
usage could never extend to candidates for public office such as Governor of Geor-
gia.").
160 United States v. Barry, No. 90-0068, 1990 WL 174907, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct.
26, 1990).
161 See id; see also Donna Britt, Sadness and Hurt in a Stunned City: For
Young Black Men, Anger and Shame, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1990, at Cl; and Rene
Sanchez, Students Voice Betrayal, Pain: Barry's 'Supposed to Be a Role Model,'
WASH. POST, Jan. 20 1990, at Al.
162 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
" See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3
(1989).
I" Id. at 660.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
narrow view" of the scope of the nation's drug problem as a
whole.'65 In Von Raab it was sufficient that the government
had a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive
societal problem from spreading to the particular context."
In contrast, while the Chandler Court initially conceded
that demonstrating a prior problem of drug abuse might not be
necessary in all cases, it effectively retracted that concession
by subsequently holding that such evidence would "shore up"
an assertion of special needs, and faulting Georgia for failing
to make such a showing.'67 In doing so, the Court held the
government to a much higher standard than it had in Von
Raab.6 ' Whereas the Von Raab Court allowed the
government's program to pass the special needs threshold
without any evidence of a drug problem among the employees
subject to testing, the government's program in Chandler fell
short of the special needs threshold despite public knowledge
of several instances of illegal drugs infecting high public office
throughout the country.6 ' The Chandler Court's departure
from the level of special needs scrutiny applied in Von Raab
led to the improper characterization of Georgia's very real,
special need as merely "hypothetical" and "symbolic."7 '
B. The Unique Context of Chandler
The "unduly narrow view" of special needs that the Court
rejected in Von Raab.7' was precisely the view that it adopt-
ed in Chandler. '72Justice Ginsburg attempted to explain this
inconsistency by stating that Von Raab was "[hiardly a deci-
sion opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches," and that
it must be read in its "unique context."'73 However, the ele-
ments that make the context of Von Raab unique according to
the Court, namely the employees' involvement with drug inter-
16 Id. at 673-74.
16 See id. at 675 n.3.
16 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
1 See Dery, supra note 9, at 87-88.
169 See supra note 1.
17o Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-22.
171 489 U.S. at 673-74.
172 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 320.
17 Id.
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diction and their potential susceptibility to bribery, 4 are ele-
ments similarly faced by high state officers. 5 Indeed, "[t]he
bribery and blackmail targeted at a Customs Service agent
pales in comparison to that directed at policymaking offi-
cials."" s Moreover, the one significant aspect that truly dis-
tinguishes the drug testing statute in Chandler from that in
Von Raab and the other special needs cases 17
7 only helps to
establish its constitutional validity-it was enacted pursuant to
Georgia's sovereign Tenth Amendment powers to establish
qualifications for its own state officers-an area where states
"should be exclusive and free from external interference, except
so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United
States"
1'78
1. Tenth Amendment Background
The Constitution created a system of dual sovereignty,
whereby both the federal government and the states' govern-
ments co-exist.7 In accordance with that scheme, the Consti-
tution established a federal government of limited power.
80
174 S ee id .
175 See id. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
.. Dery, supra note 9, at 93-94. Professor Dery observes:
The distinction between Customs Service agents in the field and high
state officials is all the more inexplicable in view of the state offices
covered by the statute. Justice Ginsburg noted that Georgia mandated
drug tests of "Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of
Appeals, (and) judges of the superior courts." These officials rule on crim-
inal cases, including drug cases arising under the laws of the state....
[Like agents in the field, judges, as their title indicates must be able to
exercise judgment.... What is true for judges may be even more accu-
rate for the attorney general and district attorneys, who were also cov-
ered by the Georgia statute. These officials represent the people of Geor-
gia in prosecuting criminal cases, including drug violations. Like drug-
interdicting Customs Service agents, the attorney general and district
attorneys are regularly exposed to [drugs and criminalsI and, therefore,
face the same dangers of bribery, blackmail, and a loss of sympathy
toward the mission of eradicating drugs.
Id.
17 See cases cited supra note 6.
17 Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900).
171 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
'" See id.
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As stated in the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
181
In early Tenth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court
addressed issues that arose through challenges to two different
types of congressional legislation based upon the power to
regulate commerce: economic regulatory laws182 and "police
power" or "moral" regulations." The Court's review of these
cases indicated that there were some areas of life which, under
the Tenth Amendment, were to be left to state regulation,
while others were to be left to the federal government-dual
federalism.' In the 1930s the Court cited the Tenth Amend-
ment in many cases striking down many of President
Roosevelt's New Deal programs. 1" However, Justice Stone's
famous 1940 opinion in United States v. Darby... appeared to
... U.S. CONST. amend. X.
1 See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S.
342 (1914) (upholding Interstate Commerce Commission's right to regulate Texas
intrastate railroad rates because there was a close and substantial relationship to
interstate commerce); and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)
(holding that Congress could not forbid a monopoly in the manufacturing of sugar
because manufacturing was a local activity having only an incidental and indirect
relation to commerce).
1 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a feder-
al child labor law because it exerted authority over a 'purely local matter"), over-
ruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940); and Champion v. Ames, 188
U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the Federal Lottery Act, which prohibited the interstate
shipment of lottery tickets).
" See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 251; Darby, 312 U.S. at 100; and Champion, 188
U.S. at 321.
" See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1936) (invalidating the
Agricultural Adjustment Act and holding [ilt would undoubtedly be an abuse of
the [taxing] power if so exercised as to impair the separate existence and indepen-
dent self-government of the States."); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294
(1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act and noting that
"[w]hile the states are not sovereign in the true sense of that term, but only qua-
si-sovereign, yet in respect of all powers reserved to them they are supreme - 'as
independent of the general government'."); and Schechter Poultry Co. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (striking down the Live Poultry Code promulgated
under the National Industrial Recovery Act and holding that "such assertions of
extra-constitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms
of the Tenth Amendment").
1 312 U.S. 100 (1940) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act which set
minimum wages and maximum hours for employees engaged in the production of
goods for interstate commerce).
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render the Tenth Amendment virtually meaningless by dis-
missing it as a mere "truism."8 v
Although Justice Stone seemed to "leave the Tenth
Amendment for dead,"'88 recent opinions that have revisited
the issue of whether the Tenth Amendment is a "[t]ruism,
[t]autology, or [vlital [p]rinciple" have resuscitated it and sug-
gest the latter.89 These opinions frequently call for a return
to "fundamental principles" of our federalist system.
1 90 One of
these principles, and "[plerhaps the most fundamental attrib-
ute of state sovereignty and the element most essential to its
existence is the power of the states to structure the processes
by which they elect those who will govern."'
9 '
2. A State's Sovereign Power to Establish Election
Qualifications
The Supreme Court has long recognized that states retain
the power to regulate their own elections under the Tenth
Amendment. 92 As explained by Chief Justice Fuller in 1900:
, Id. at 124. Justice Stone declared:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to sug-
gest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments as it had been established by the Consti-
tution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers
not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their
reserved powers.
Id.
"8 John R. Vile, Truism Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment
Since United States v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 445, 520 (1997).
... Id. at 445; see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995)
(holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 infringed upon the general
police power retained by the states). Lopez marked the first time in over 60 years
that the Court invalidated a federal statute for interfering with "what is truly
local." Id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (invali-
dating the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 and holding that Congress is prevented from "commandeering"
the legislative process of the states under the Tenth Amendment); and Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (upholding Missouri constitutional provision mandat-
ing retirement of state judges at the age of 70 against federal statutory and Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection claims); see infra notes 194-205 and accompa-
nying text.
'90 See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457.
191 Todd J. Zywicki, Federal Judicial Review of State Ballot Access Regulations:
Escape From the Political Thicket, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 87, 94 (1994).
192 See Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892) ("Each State has the power to
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It is obviously essential to the independence of the states, and to
their peace and tranquillity, that their power to prescribe the quali-
fications for their own officers, the tenure of their offices, the man-
ner of their election, and the grounds on which, the tribunals before
which, and the mode in which, such elections may be contested,
should be exclusive and free from external interference, except so far
as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.'93
The Court most recently gave new force to Judge Fuller's
characterization of a state's sovereign interest in determining
the qualifications for its own officers in Gregory v. Ashcroft."
In Gregory, the Court relied exclusively on principles of state
sovereignty to uphold a Missouri constitutional provision man-
dating the retirement of state judges at the age of seventy
against both federal statutory and Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection claims.'95 Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor premised her opinion on the notion that determining
the qualifications for state officers "is a decision of the most
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity."9 ' While the Court
conceded that the authority of States to determine the qual-
ifications for its officers is not without limits, Justice O'Connor
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment may not be applied
in "complete disregard for a State's constitutional powers." '
Rather, a State's power to define the qualifications of its own
officers may have force even against an individual's constitu-
tional protections.'
The principles of federalism recognized in Gregory provide
an added element of constitutional validity to the Chandler
statute that was not present in the drug testing plans that
were upheld in Skinner," Von Raab,2" and Vernonia.2°'
"How curious for a Court that had recently championed the
importance of state sovereignty to choose to meddle with
Georgia's right to determine who will guide its own peo-
prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be
chosen . . . ").
'" Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900).
'94 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
19 See id.
*" Id. at 460.
1" Id. at 468.
198 See id.
'" 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
2® 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
2" 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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ple."02 The Chandler Court should not only have considered
the efficacy of Georgia's drug testing statute but also the au-
tonomy of the State of Georgia as a "viable actorD in the con-
stitutional system."2"' Gregory provided a rule that "scrutiny
will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting




rule, the Court reasoned, is simply "a recognition of a State's
constitutional responsibility for the establishment and opera-
tion of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an
appropriately designated class of public officeholders."2 5
Even if one humors the largely insupportable distinctions
that the Court drew between Chandler and its precedents,
those purported inconsistencies should have been viewed under
a more deferential assessment of Georgia's special need.
26 A
finding of special needs in Chandler would not have "open[ed]
broad vistas for suspicionless searches,"2 M nor would it have
eroded the Fourth Amendment2 8 because it would have been
rooted in history and precedent emphasizing state sovereignty
and the unique context of election qualification statutes. The
proper finding of special needs would have* then triggered the
balancing test, which the Chandler Court conceded that Geor-
gia would have easily passed because of the relatively
noninvasive nature of its drug testing statute.2 9
CONCLUSION
Blinded by its staunch determination to grade the slippery
slope of special needs, the Chandler Court irrationally struck
down a statute with greater constitutional merit than any of
202 Dery, supra note 9, at 98-99. "By fighting the states-rights tide it set in
motion, the Court in Chandler demonstrated how the special needs test permits
precedent to be disregarded in favor of subjective values." Id.
203 Zywicki, supra note 191, at 118.
20 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462 (1991) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)) (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 462 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648).
206 See Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1534, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S.
305 (1997) ("[Wle regard the states as entitled to considerable deference in the
characterization of their own interests.).
207 Chandler, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
206 See Malin, supra note 9, at 517.
200 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317; see also supra note 113 and accompanying
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its predecessors that were upheld. Acting out of its fear of fur-
ther eroding the traditional protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment through the special needs exception, the Court ignored
the factual and constitutional ammunition that would have al-
lowed it to uphold the statute without diminishing the Fourth
Amendment's integrity. Instead, the Court threw stare decisis
overboard with such disregard that its dissolution muddied the
constitutional waters that the Court had sought to protect.
Eric B. Post
